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CHAPTER

T

INTRODUCTION
In thin paper I shall examine the problem of per-

sonal Identity ns dealt with by John Locke. There are re-

lated issues that set the groundwork for his discussion of
the personal identity problem. These issues include
in the technical

of

eta

sense ns distinct from ’man,'

'person'

the relation

terial and immaterial substance, the nature of mind, and

consciousness.
The predominant world view at the time of Locke's

writing has been conveniently labeled the Galilean-CartesianNewtonian world view. This period of time in which Locke was

writing was characterized by the great rationalistic systems
hand, and on
of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz, on the one

broufht on in part
the other hand, by the rise of empiricism
science in renernl.
by Locke's vork nnd the development of

repnrded ns
The world of nature nt this time was

n

vast

with through mathephysical machine capable of belnr dealt
rationalists, the it.enl
matics. For Descartes and the other
deductive system established
of science was an nll-embraclnc
In nature nnd,
by a method primarily mathematical

established by
scientists, the ideal was to be

a

for the

mathematical

interpreting the
empirical method. The dominant ways of
antiquity, subrtnnca
world remained the nbsolutlstic ones of
from Descartes
and attribute. In renernl, what philosophers
1

2

to Locke had to say about substance, the
mind-body relationship, individuation, causality and
most other topics of

philosophical interest vas to instirnte
in r point in philosophy.

«

momentous turn-

Locke's handling of the personal

identity problem was a serious attempt to deal for the
first
ti-n©

with on© of the most difficult problems.
The world ns experienced was regarded ns

a

state or

states of an experiencing subject. The realm of secondary

qualities, which are subjective in nature, was sharply

contrasted to their causes, the actual world of primary

qualities and substances. For the most part, a basic dualism vas thought to exist with mind as one substance with its

physical nature. Man was viewed as

a

complex entity comprised

of both substances, mind and body. Physically,
a

rann

vas Just

small part in a vast world machine. As such, his body was

governed by laws of mechanical nature Just as any other part
of the world would be roverned. Mentally, man was a spectator and knower of the world of nature, in the sense that

when his body vas stimulated tho primary qualities of external bodies caused ideas in the mind of man. These ideas

were then combined on the basis of various principles

(

e.g.,

resemblance, cause and effect, or identity) with the result
being knowledge. The details of this process were never either adequately explained or understood and the problem of

how to explain the relation between the human mind and the

human body led to a number of inadequate "solutions," e.g.,

3

intemctionism, occasionalism and parallelism. The difficulty of this problem is shown in that after Locke

Charles Morris points out,

"

it may be

,

as

said that all suc-

ceeding theories of mind, bas*d on the concepts of
process,
act, relation, substantive, and function, are

at,

one in

their opposition to an explanation of mind in terms of sub-

stance.”

1

Althourh Locke accepted much of this view of things
he partially withdrew from the substantialist view since he

refused to concern himself with the basic nature of either
mind or body. But his withdrawal was not all

a

shift in

emphasis. Rather, it was an implicit acceptance of the domi-

nant substance view coupled with

a

hesitation to say anything

about the essence of a substance because we cannot know anything about it. He was the first philosopher of his age to

regard philosophy not ns

a

super-science, essentially simi-

lar to other special sciences, but as a critical discipline
of unique status nnd with special problems of its own. Not
the least of these problems was to give adequate account of

the identity conditions for such things as ’persons.'

ironi-

cally, Locke’s thought can in some ways still be rernrded as
an instance of the contemporary world vi*v. His empiricism

has not carried him that far away from the Cartesian ration-

alism and serves, according to Morris,

”

to bridge the gap

Morris, C. W. Sis Thenri e ^ 9l Mind
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1932, p. 2^.
i.

,

.

University

r

.

4

2

b*tvft*n thourht and sense that Is found In
Desenrtes."
Ivocke

Yet,

leaves the inquiry into the nature of mind nnd body

nside and says that the essence o r substance
is unknowable
It could be that in these matters Locke was subject
to the influence of the past more than he realized
or admit-

ted. He can be seen, however, as a transitional firure from

Cartesian rationalism to the empiricism of Berkeley and Hume.
We tend to repard his philosophy as the point of departure

for his empiricist successors. The empiricists that followed

Locke were confronted with

a

traditional body of beliefs

with which they intensly disagreed. Locke was not

a

total re-

former since he was ready to do battle with only specific

traditional beliefs. But he beran

a

movement toward critical

analysis which tried to uncover what was thought to be many
of the irrational origins of those beliefs to which the

empiricist philosophers were opposed. The notion of substance
was not the least objectionable.
The reneral purpose of Locke's

M

E ssay

Concerning

Huma n Under standing was, as he tells us, to inquire

into the oririn of those idea s « notions, or whatever else you please to call them which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his
mind; nnd the ways whereby ..the understand Inp: comes
to be r urnished with them.*

2.

i

n

I,

.

p.

Morris,

p.

39.

3. Locke, John, An, Essay Cone? relax: Hu inn
ed. A. C. Eraser, Dover BubL lea t ions , New York,

23,

Hereafter referred to as Eg_S&y .

Under;tand19^9, Vol.

5

I-ocke

attempted to show how nil our ideas can
be

explained on the hypothesis that they
originate either in
sense-perception introspection or reflection.
Even though
Locke affirmed the ultimately experiential
origin
,

of nil

ideas, he did not restrict knowledge
to the immediate data
of experience. On the contrary, he believed that
there were

complex ideas which have objective re r erence, constructed
or
framed out of simple ideas by the active power of our minds.
The idea of substance which supports those primary qualities

which in turn produce in the perceiving subject ideas of secondary qualities is such an idea. Locke was convinced that
there had to be substances and even thourh we never perceive

them it must be possible to frame ideas of such substances.

The idea of

n

person and the idea of personal identity

were also thought to be framed in this way by the mind. Since
these complex ideas are framed by the mind and not riven di-

rectly in perception we can put aside interest in their origin in favor of interest in their adequacy.
Tt is in this perspective that we must find Locke's

iden of person. Unfortunately he does not develop this idea

systematically; rather, he puts forth by bits and pieces
only what serves his purpose at the time. We are left to fill
in details of this enigmatic notion.

Because Locke's idea of

person is inadequate his analysis of personal identity in

Chapter

2.7

of the Essa y is incomplete.

Locke's discussion of the problem of personal identi-

6
ty is

e till

ones

of most original nnd important p*irts of the

hiumy- His discussion constitutes an attack on the traditional Cartesian dormatism - as much an
attack as his iden of

substance did for he recomized the irrelevance of
substance
in

answering questions of personal identity. Despite its
de-

fects, Locke's theory of self-identity is e much
better posi-

tion than could ever be sustained from the contemporary substance theory of his time.

However, Locke does not completely free himself from
the consequences of the traditional substance theory. Ques-

tions concerning the identity of an underlying mental or
physical substance are dismissed from the realm of knowledge,
but they are not found to be unintelligible. Locke believed

that there was an unknowable substrate to the mental life of
an individual nnd that the identity of consciousness had to
bo associated either with one
a

substance or successively with

number of substances, furthermore, he expresses the con-

viction that

"

the more probable opinion is, that this con-

sciousness is annexed to, and the a^ection of, one individual

immaterial substance."

14
"

But such

a

substance which is un-

knowable cannot, therefore, be shown to stand in some essential relation to the self of consciousness. Locke correctly

recognized that

r nct

that substance cannot be retained as the

basis for solution of the personal identity problem.
Kss ay . Volume 1%

p.

465.

7

tffith

All theories of self there la a corresponding

problem of personal Identity as
nrtlcle "The Concept of

a

A.

J.

Ayer points out In hi

a

Person. "5 Put oven on physicalistic

accounts of the self there Is the renernl nroblom of specifying conditions for the Identifier tlon and re identification
of the particular thinr in question. Locke, however, must

deal with the special variations of the problem of personal

identity suited to his theory since his theory is not physical istic. Locke's dualistic account of human bcinrs makes it

necessary for him to deal with the relation of immaterial
and material substance, whether there could be more than one

mind in a sinrle body or whether there can exist one mind at

different times in different bodies.

There are

a

number of underlying problems which form

the basis for the personal identity problem. Among these are

metaphysical, moral-legal and psycholonical considerations.

Metaphysically, the identity problem arises simply by saying
that a riven type of thing exists. Once

n

certain class of

things is said to exist analysis of it entails specifying

conditions under which an individual of

a

class can be in-

dividuated from others of the class. This is true of an entity of any class, but it presents special problems when the
r
entitles are persons. Linked to this is the problem o the

fir

says

,

Ayer, A. J., Th$ Concert of
ft. Martin's Press, Lew Ynrk,

W4 CC2I

*

P*

8

endurance of

n

reidentify

person ns the snme at time 2 ns at time

a

perron through time and how it is possible to
Moral

1.

considerations which rive rise to the problem Include the

necessity

r or

ascribing praise or blame (including r^llqious

questions of immortality and ascribinr rewards and punishments
in some

immortal state of

n

parson)

asslminq rights of inheritance
£ one more exotic

,

and the necessity for

or criminal responsibility.

ways in which the problea is seen is through

psycholoricnl considerations. These miqht Include cases of
amnesia, brain transfer and reincarnation. All such cases ulti-

mately lead to the basic problem, i.e., how to specify conditions for identifying and re identify lnq

a

particular person.

Locke recognized that his account of the self made it

necessary for him to analyze the identity problem. In his
Kssn y^ Locke su rests that the idea of identity is formed

throurh

a

comparison of the very be inn of a thinq, as exist-

ing at a determinate time and place, with the same thinq

©xistinq at an earlier time and place. In the case of

a

per-

son, then, it would seem to be necessary to compare the "very

beinq" of the person at one time and place with that person
at an earlier time ard place in order to determine his identity*

In the very r irst sentence of the first section of Chap-

ter 27 of Book IT o r the

K_r_rav,

ve s^e the direction that

Locke's discussion must take. Hopefully, at the outcome of
this discussion ve will have

"very be inf" of
Mr say

a

.

a

clear conception of what the

person consists in for Locke.

p.

470.

CHAPTER
LOCKET CONCEPT OF
A.

II
A

PERSON

Oelf and Person

Throughout his discussion of personal identity in
Chapter 27 of Hook II of the Hr my
'person*

«

Locke treats the terns

and 'self as nearly synonymous. In Chapter 27 he

define 3 'person' as:

thinklnr end intelligent beinr that has reason
and reflection and can consider itself ns itself,
the sane thinklnr thinr, in different times and
places: which it does only bv that consciousness
which is Inseparable from thinking and essential
to it.'
a

This bears

a

striking resemblance to the explanation ho

Gives for self ten pares later. There he says:
self is that conscious thinklnr thinr. .vhat-ever
substance made up of, (whether spiritual or material, simple or compounded, it matters not)... which
is sensible or conscious of pleasure or nnin, capa„
ble of happiness ormisery, and so is concerned
for itself, ns far as that consciousness extends.
.

*

In the former definition Locke emphasizes
al aspect o r the beinr

a

ration-

in question, while in the latter

definition he emphasizes an emotional aspect. Both, however, denote the same thinr. Also, in both definitions he

stresses the reflexive nature of the beinr* Central to both

definitions is the notion of consciousness. The person has

1.

E ssa y

.

Volume I, pp. 44^-9.

2.

Tbjd.

,

pp. 45 '-0.
9

10

consciousness by which it con be avnre o r itself ns self.
Hiis consciousness is capable of extending through space
and tine vith the self. Also, in the definition of
self
loci:©

indicates that it does not natter vhat the substance

consists of; yet, the implication is that the self is

sub-

a

stantial being. In the definition of person he speaks of

thinking intelligent bein g.

"

a

So the implication here is

also on substantial character. It is clear that the two terms
are synonymous and, indeed, Locke asserts:

"Person, as

I

take it, is the name for this self. "3
It should be emphasized that Locke's description
of person or self was nn attempt to explicate a concept of

ordinary usage or language. He took the terms as he found
them in ordinary language and gave them what ho thought to
be more precision. He did this by putting the terms into

context of

n

systematic definition. The terms were related

to a set of terms that would formulate a philosophical formula.

B.

The concept of

Person and Man

a

person is extended by Locke when he

dirtlngui shes it from the idea of man. The distinction between person and man is one which Locke takes pains to make
even though he realized they are ordinarily used in the snme

3.

IMd.,

p.

>*66.

.

11

vny.

“I

know,” ho wrote, "that in the ordinary vny or spenk-

ing, the same person and the came nan stand for one and the
ca-ne

thing.”

34

But he wished to distinruisb these two express-

ions brcause he believed that careful thourht showed that

they stood

r or

different things.

’Person' refers to that

"thinking intelligent being” and "the idea in our minds of

which the sound in our mouths is the sign, is nothing else
but of nn animal of such

certain form.”^ An animal is

a

nothing but nn organized living body.
To emphasize the distinction between person and man

Locke brings up the possibility of there being nn intelligent

parrot who could speak, reason and philosophize.^ A rational parrot certainly would not be called a man nor would a

non-rationnl human being be called anything hut

man. The

a

former does fulfill Locke's definition of n "thinking, inThe bodily structure of

to ligent being.
1

a

man, on the

other hand, which lncks rationality would not be called

n

person. A person, then, is not a rational man since man (in
the technical sense that Locke wants to bring out) has refer-

ence only to bodily form and this form is not part of the

meaning of person for Locke.

There seem to be two difficulties that undermine
4.

T

bid

.

p.

457.

5.

Ibid.

,

p.

445.

6.

Ibid.

.

pp.4U6-

c

l.

Shoemaker, Sydney, Se lf -Kno wledge ITd
l?c>3* P* 14
ty, Cornell University Press, Ithaca,
7.

-

I.ock«

definition. First o' nil, although
hock. vss skeptical that there could be
such a think ns a rational
parrot
and his stated belief
that It would b- called
"nothing tut”
a Parrot he had to
Incorporate the story to show the
dlfOrnce be.veen person nrd nan.
His Intent was only to point out
that a nan without reason
would not be called a person. Hut
this could have been done
without the rational parrot story.
Secondly , he has -nde the distinction
between person and nan
too sharp. Part o r the concept
of a person oupht
to be

a

bodily orranlzatlon of a certain forn'
or his definition
would be too broad and a parrot could
qualify as a person.
I.ocite

wanted the distinction between person and
nan

nade clear because the person is the entity
for noral praise
and blame. As to person In this matter Locke
says* "It is a

forensic term, appropriating actions and their merits;
and
so be Ion ns only to intellirent agents, capable
of law, and

happiness and misery ." 8 As simply an orranized body man can

never be the arent of responsibility. Persons are the
apents
who ure accountable ^or past actions. They are the
proper objects

r or

punishment or reward. Even though his discussion

implies that man is not responsible for past actions, it is
the livinr entity through which a person functions. This pre-

sents another difficulty. The difficulty is that if the dis-

tinction between person and man is ns sharp ns Locke seems to
indicate then could the courts ever be Justified in in r lictinr

0

g

13

punishment on

a

living body for It, by his definition, cnn-

not be responsible for its actions? Punishments end rewords

ought to be reserved strictly for persons since they nre the

proper objects of punishment. But is it possible to punish
the person without punishing the man? Locke hints nt tills

when he says: "Human lavs punish both, with a justice suitable to their way of knowledge.

..

because in these cases,

they cannot distinguish what is real from what is counter-

feit."

0
*

Either punishment should be inflicted on persons ex-

clusively (which is impossible) or the split between person
and man is not nltore trier ns real as he thourht.

Sydney Shoemaker in Self -Know! ^d

e

ar.d

Sel^-Td^rt lty

says that "on Locke’s definition of person the statement 'I
am a person’ turns out to be necessarily self-verifying;
it

if

is asserted, then no matter whet asserts it it must be

true

’’

1

.

This contention is certainly true. For what can
Shoemaker mean by "necessarily self verifying?" He states;
If somethin*7 produces any sentence whatever it is
either uttering the words as a machine mirht in
which case it asserts nothing, and therefore nothing that is true or false, or else it is making an
assertion, in which case it is by Locke's definition
ima person. So on this definition it is logically
used
be
to
person"
n
"I
am
sentence
possible for the
to make a false statement. Either it makes no asser-

9.

10.

Ibid,. ,

p.

fhoemaker,

463.
p.

14.

14

tlon at nil or It makes one that Is true. It
Is
is
true
if
it
Is
1
a sre rted

necessarily the case that it
.

Put is necessarily self-verity inr only for

-nan,

benst or rod uttering it? For nnyone not utterlnp
It the

problem exists whether the sentence Is nn assertion or
not.
It is necessarily true only if It is nn assertion.

der to

if it

flee

is nn assertion the hearer must determine

whether the beinn Is fulfillinr the definition of
In the case of the
fi

"1

n

person

,

"

In or-

a

person.

supposed rational parrot who utters "I

Prince Maurice if he were inclined to must

determine whether the sentence was nn assertion by enrapinp
the parrot in conversation to see whether in fnct it vn§

rational. If the parrot proved to be rational, then its

utterance

am

"I

a

person' would be proved necessarily true.
1

We mipht also say with Shoemaker that the sentence
*1

am not

a

person'

is necessarily self-refutinp, if it is nn

assertion. For what is essential in his contention is that

only persons can make assertions. Therefore, either it is
nn assertion or no statement at all. But if in the case of
the opposite it is an assertion then it is necessarily false.
In any care we must determine whether the thine utterinr the

sentence is

a

C.

person.

v

'nterlal and Immaterial Substance

Locke's treatment o r the idea of substance
11.

Ibid

in

rener-

2

"

3

15

al carrier, with it important consequences for the
ideas ve

have of material nnd immaterial substances. The steps in-

volved in deriving the idea of substance can be reconstructed from the Krsny and Locke

First Letter to Bishop Stlll-

'

inrfleet. The Hind, beinr furnished with ideas or sensible

qualities from sensation and the ideas of perceiving thinking and knowing from reflection on its own operations, "takes

notice also that

n

certain number of these simple ideas go

constantly together.

1

Yet,

"

the ideas of these Qualities

nnd actions or powers are perceived by the mind to be by

themselves in consistent with existence, i.e., that they
cannot exist or subsist of themselves. Hence the mind per-

ceives their necessary connexion with inherence or being

supported."^ Now since the idea of inherence Is
idea superndded" to either qualities

the "mind frames

a

of-

a

"relative

sense or reflection,

correlative idea of support." 1 ^ Although

the idea of a relation can be framed by the mind it "cannot
be bounded on nothing, or be the relation of nothing."

1

5

Part of this relation, however, remains only the idea of

"some substratum wherein" the qualities
ts.

Essa y. Volume I,

p.

o<*

sense nnd reflec-

390.

Locke, John, Works , Scientia Verier Aalen, Germany, 19^3. Volume IV, p. 2’ff.
13

,

14.

TMd.

t5.

ibid.

r

.

16

Uon

"do subsist

cnU substance

from which they do result which we

nr.d

n1

,J

Thus the only general idea of substance

ve can understand is Locke's famous
"a supposed

I

know not

vhnt" underlying nil our experience.
It is,

therefore, Impossible to determine the essen-

tial nature of either material or immaterial
substance, i.e.

,

the essential nature of both body and mind
remains indeter-

minate.

-he

idea o r one sterns to be as vnrue ns the other.

The idea we have of
•*the

a

material substance can only indicate

substratum to those simple ideas we have from without"

while the idea of an immaterial substance indicates
only
'

the substratum to those operations we experiment in our-

selves within

1
.

Our knowledre does not extend to essen-

tial nature o r either body or mind. The substrn

turn

cases lies beyond our rrnsp just as the substratum

in these
in gener-

al does. We can only be sure that the qualities given in

sensation and reflection cannot stand alone so there must be
a

substratum to both body and mind. James Gibson in

Theory o r Kn owl ed

e

kl£jie_Ls

says the following:

The Cartesian dualism of finite substances is,
therefore, seen to be an entirely unbounded
piece of dogmatism. In its place we have a distinction within experience between two kinds of
ideas, and a confession of entire ignorance concerning the rature o r the substrate Implied in
Ky rav . Volume TI, pp. 390-1. Also discussed in an
article by Robert A~merman, "Our Knowledre of fubst.ance According to Locke," Th» >r 1 a 1965* Volume 3 1 > P«3*
16 .

.

17.

K? ra y . Volume II, p.

395.

17
,

each case.

i

p

The qualities of sensation and reflection shown In

experience constitute whatever can be known about body ard
aiind.

We do, therefore, know certain characteristics that are

idiosyncrasies of each. Those that are idiosyncratic of bodies are the cohesion of parts, extended parts, and -nobility.

There are other qualities of bodies but they are dependent
on these qualities. Those characteristics which are idio_

syncretic of minds are thinking and the power to move by

willing, ^ certain ideas are common to both bodies and minds.
‘'The

idens existence
.

,

dura tl on and mohl

1

\

ty are common to th^m

both. "23 To ascribe mobility to minds is unusual.
It must be acknowledged that Locke's position on

minds differs from the traditional Cartesian view in two
ways. First, he believes minds may have mobility and spatial extent os well, fecond, he surrests a materialist hy-

pothesis for the nature of mind which would deny that

human being was

a

combination of material and immaterial

a

substances.
21.
Concerning the spatial properties of minds he

states.

"

Where and when are questions belonring to all fi-

nite existences ." 21

lie

nrrues that since the mind or soul

Gibson, James, Locke's Th»^r y oc Kn owled ge, Cambridge Vniversitv Tress, Cambridge ,19*0, p.97.
19

19 . Krsay
20.

.

Volume I, pp. Uo 6 -^.

Ibid.

,

p.

Uo^.

Ibid.

.

p.

2*3-

e

in

is

ft

’‘renl

being" Just ns body "it is certainly capable
of

changing distance with nny other body, or
being, ns body itself nnd so capable of motion ,:PP
Whnt is evident here is
Locke's belief in the intimate
relationship
-

.

of mind nnd body.

Kxpei ience assures us that the mind cnn
"operate on his body
Ln

the place where that is." So if n man
roes on

a

journey,

his mind, we cannot but know "that, it being united
to his
body, it constantly changes place nil the whole
Journey." 2 ^

His conclusion is that since minds may move the body at different times nnd places and since it moves with the body from
place to place, it must be locntnble and moveable.
Such considerations probably prompted Locke to put

forth his materialist hypothesis of mind.

pj.

He supposed mat-

ter may have the power of thought "cuperadded" to it. So

would not minds be extended? Put if minds are simple substances, as they were in the Cartesian view, they could not
be extended (for whatever is extended is divisible and so

cnnnot be simple). Locke does not insist that minds are extended but he seems to say that it is not self-contradictory
that "the first Eternal thinking Being or Omnipotent Spirit
should, if he pleased, give to certain systems of created

senseless ma tter.

. .

some decree of sense, perceptions and

thought.

22.
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1.

Aaron in John Lock? offers

n

rood explanation

as to why Locke was not clear ns to the relation of
mind nnd

body. He suggests that Lock© was divided between two
camps:

Descartes' dualism and Hobbes' materialistic monism. On the
one hand, "He found it difficult to think of -an
as composed
of two distinct substances, material and

1 -material.

This

violated for him the unity of human personality."^ On the
other hand, Locke could accept the possibility of Hobbes'

"thinking body" but he could not accept pure materialism for
"mere matter can never be the source of thourht even though

material beings think.
Locke was not surresting that the materialist hypothesis is correct but only that it is not beyond the power of

an Omnipotent Being to institute "thinking body" if he so

d*sire3. It could be a logical possibility. He says in regard to the postulate of material substance as a source of

thourht "that when we allow it produce pleasure or pain, or
the idea of a colour or sound we are fain to quit our reason,
go beyond our ideas, and attribute

pleasure of our Maker,” furthermore

it wholly to the rood
,

the "state that we are

in at present in not being that of vision, we must in many
03

things content ourselves with faith nnd probability."'

Since

we have only material ideas nnd thinking nnd since knowledge

26.

ford,

1
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%
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27.
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extends only ns fnr ns our ldens 29
ve have no krovl.dre ns
,
to how tbov nre related. Go the
lden o r relationship between
mind and body is in n state of doubt and
the materialistic
hypothesis becomes a possibility. Matter -nay
Indeed be en-

dowed by God with the power of thought. Locke
will not, however, make clains about the essence of
mind. nevertheless.

Chapter 27 of Book

II

points toward the immateriality of the

mind. He says at one point,
in?:

substance.

.

.which it

"

-nay

This eternal, immaterial, thinkbe proved that it is to the

hirhest decree probable that it is im material
cussion of the 'aateriality of mind is more

a

.

"

30 This dis-

comment on God’s

omnipotence than on Locke's metaphysical beliefs. "The problem of the mind-body relation is one which, in Locke's opinion, is at present beyond our powers, since the inner nature
o r mind itself ns well ns body is so completely hidden from

us. "3 1

D.

Person and Immaterial Substance

If we assume with Locke that the mind is immaterial we have to consider what this assumption amounts to and

also explore the possibility that person is an immaterial substance, keeping what we have discussed above still in mind.

191.
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Lock© accepts the traditional view that the mind
is
nn

torinl substance. He also accepts the dualistic
in-

herence of an active immaterial mantel substance and
the body
ns a passive material substance. Unlike
his Cartesian pre-

decessors, however, he admits to ignorance concerning
the

essential nature of either material or immaterial substance,
fie

feels that substance is necessary for the inherence of

qualities and powers. Thus he does not cross the line into Berkeley’s corporeal phenomenalism or Hume’s complete

phenomenalism.
Locke did not hold that thinking is the essence of

mind as did Descartes. He held that if thinking were the
essence of mind then it would always be going on in the
mind. But Locke did not believe that proof could be offered

for this since during sleep, for example, the mind does not
think, so thinking cannot be the essence of mind. It,

like perceiving ideas, is one of the operations of our minds

which is shown in experience and not in its essence. Locke
states, "To say that actual thinking is essential to the
soul, and inseparable from it, is to beg what is the question

and not to prove it by reason.”^

He based this nrrumnnt

on the fact that the mind "cannot think at any time waking
or sleeping, without being sensible of it. "33 Awareness of

one’s thinking is necessary to that thinking. It seems that
32.

Hgr av

<

33.

IMd,

.

Volume I, pp. 129-9.
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if tlourht were the essence of mind ve would
nlvays be think-

and would be aware

o'’

that thinking.

The doctrine of immaterial substance stems from

Locke's view that some substance i? needed for the
qualities
of an object "cohere." liven thourh the essence of this
sub-

stance is beyond us ve still regard ourselves as selves.

Locke says that ve have an intuitive idea cf our ovn being!
As for our ovn existence ve perceive it so plainly
and so certainly that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof. For nothing can be- more evident to
Us than our own existence. I think, I reason, I feel
pleasure and pain: can any of these bo more evident
to me than my ovn existence? If I doubt all other
things, that very doubt makes me perceive my ovn
existence, and will not suffer aeto doubt of that
...Experience then convinces us, that ve have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence and an internal and infallible perception that ve are. In every act
of sensation, reasoning, or thinking, ve are conscious
to ourselves of our own being; and in this -natter,
cone not short o r the hirhest certainty. 3,

This knov/ledre is merely that ve exist, without knowing vhat ve are.

"It is past controversy, that we have in us

something that thinks; our very doubts about vhat
firm the certainty

o<*

it

is, con-

its being, though we must content our-

selves in the ignorance of what kind o r being it is."^ Yet,
ve constantly re r er to the self so the word must have some

meaning for us. Self is a synonym for person and both words
are used by Locke to designate a "thinking intelligent being."
So it would seem that person itself is an immaterial sub-

34.

ibid .

35.
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stance. This Is win rented from at
least some of the things
that Locke h ns said. 37

berson and Consciousness

L.

There are certain passages In the Hssay
that surest
that the concept of a person was
to be distinguished from
substance Just as it had been from man.
His statements to the
effect that the identity of substance does
not constitute
personal identity clinches the case against
reducing person
to substance. He states:

"it be inn one thing to the same sub-

£l™£2. another to the same maa and
Itit

third the same person. ”38

a

all of this does not help us to understand the
term per-

son. His phrase "thinking intelligent being"
is also

a

seem-

ingly poor choice of words for we are led into
thinking that
person denotes

a

substantial being. But

I

think that on the

contrary Locke's view seems to have rather been that
"consciousness, (which is that alone which makes what we call
sel_f)...i s annexed to, and the affection of, one
individual
37. substance . "39
immaterial

it

l3 the view that the self is an-

nexed and the affection of an immaterial substance which is
Locke's view.

Most o r what

I

have said is about what

a

person is

not. Does Locke have a more positive view of person?

From the materinl quoted in

fhoemaker,

p.

46.

38.

Fspav . Volume I,

39.

Ibid.

.

p.

pp, 462-65.
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above three important components of Lock©

Flrct ’

n

pfrrs0R

*9

view are

is not nn 1-nmaterlal (or material)

«

parent.

substance,

fecond, consciousness alone is what constitutes
person. Third,
consciousness is annexed to nn immaterial substance.
Thus we
can r*°er to the person as that
consciousness which is annexed
to an immaterial thinking substance.
I'Ocke

says that consciousness is essential to person:

"for whatever substance there is, however framed,
without con-

sciousness there is no person." 40 Consciousness originates
.

ron reflection. Thinking, for Locke, is always accompanied

by consciousness. He says for example, "thinking consists
in

being conscious that one thinks." 41 The operation of the mind
will not let one be without some awareness of oneself. It is
a

reflex act which accompanies all operations of mind by

which the self is aware and which also constitutes the self.

42

It is in reflection that consciousness finds its most

characteristic representation. In reflection there is no

i-

dea conveyed into the mind from without, so Locke is able to

define it as "that notice which the mind takes of its own op-

erations, and the manner of them, by whereof there come to be
ideas of those operations in the understanding." 4 ^ In re-

flection we find that the mind as an "immaterial substance"
is engaged in activity of which the distinctive feature is

4A4.

40.

Ibid,

.

p.

41.

Ibid.

.

p.449.

42. IMji.

,

p.444ff.

43.
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p.
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consciousness. Consciousness is not li-nited
to reflection
but is present in a special way
when the mind is enraged in
nny fora of perception or thinking.
Thought is accompanied by
the consciousness of the fact that we
are thinking.

It is

"impossible for anyone to perceive without perce
ivinr that
he does perceive.
The consciousness that thoughts belong to
oneself is

what comprises that self and this constitutes
what is referred
to as the reflexive nature of the
Lockian self.

When consciousness is present the perceptions
become

objects of the mind. "Consciousness is the
perception of what
parses in

n

man’s own mind."*4

’'*

Consciousness could be referred

to as self-consciousness in that by reflection we can be
aware
of our mind’s activity as an object of that same reflection.
So, person is the consciousness or awareness of all that pass-

es before the mind of

a

human being.

If this definition of person is accepted, however,
all we can say of a person is what is passing across his

consciousness right now. But Locke goes on to

3 ny:

This personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness, whereby it becomes concerned nnd accountable; owns and imputes to Itself past actions, just upon the same
ground ^nd for the same reason as it does the present.

Therefore, the person would include not only what is
present but all the experiences that have passed that he
44.

p. LLo.

45. Ibid.

p.

13 B

46.

p.

46?

m<L.,

'

.
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can remember.

There Toro, It seems that, for Locke, per eon is the
su-n

of total experience, past nnd present, of which the mind

has the power to become conscious. Consciousness is the
im-

portant quality of

a

person because anything that cannot be

brought Into it is not an actual part of

a

person. The per-

son is the awareness that accompanies all nets of thinking,

willing, imagining and experiencing in general. Consciousness is alone "what makes what we call the

self.''*4 ?

X have tried to show that person is not

for Locke,

a

substantial

It is not a substance. It would be wrong to think

of his phrase "thinking intelligent being" ns denoting an

immaterial thinking substance

.

In the second definition

cited from Book II of the Essa y, it matters not what the

substance is made up of, whether it is spiritual or material, simple or compounded. But, a person has reality in that
it

is nil the experiences that can be recalled or accompany

at present a certain immaterial substance

-

consciousness. It

is that reflexive awareness experienced by the mind of a

human being. This awareness gives unity to the person nnd so
by this awareness he knows he is different from any other

thinking thing.
Evidently, by this definition of person,

a

person de-

pends for existence on some underlying immaterial substance
but not a particular immaterial substance. Because of his

47.

Ib1 d

.

p.462.
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series of experiences

ft

person is different from the body

of a man which is always the same human form of organized

material particles. But person and man together form the
human being.
This,

I

think, is what Locke meant when he wrote

Chapter 27 of Book II of the Essay

.

CHAPTER

T

II

LOCKE ON PERGONAL IDENTITY
In Chapter 27 of Book II of the Ksrnv

Of Identity and Diversity

.

entitled

Locke offers an important ampli-

fication of his principle of individuation. In general,
this
principle "determines a being of any sort to

a

particular

time and place, incommunicable to two beings of the
same

kind." 1 Locke, however, discriminates among four kinds of
senses of this principle of identity: (1) logical identity, A is A;

atoms;

(3)

(2)

the identity of an atom and argrerates of

the identity of living organisms; and (4) per-

sonal identity.
At the start of the chapter, Locke declares of the

first kind of entity, "When we see anything to be in any
place in any Instant of time, we are sure (be it what it

will) that it is that very thing and not another which exists at the same time in another place.

what he takes to be

a

This follows from

self-evident principle. Namely, no two

things of the same kind can occupy that same place at the
same time. Nor can we ever conceive of it. Thus we are led to

conclude that whatever exists at any place at any time excludes
all other things of the same kind and is, therefore, it-self
•>

alone.

rr
Locke dist inruishes among three di erer.t kinds of
1.

Essa y. Volume I, pp. 441-2.

2.
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substances: God, finite spirits of mind nnd finite
bodies.
The circumscription 'same kind* is
needed for Locke believes
thnt

n

finite mind nnd

n

finite body could occupy the same

piece nt the seme time. God, also, is rernrded
nc eternal
nnd present throughout spnce nnd time. It is
only exister.ts
of the snme kind, therefore, which are mutually exclusive.

Otherwise there would be no way to distinruish two things of
the same kind. We can distinguish things similar in kind by

their spatial nnd temporal locations.*
A.

4-

Atoms, Aggregates and Living Organisms

We can proceed now to other senses of identity for

logical identity is operative in them all. If this was not
the case, then confusion would abound on all sides for ’’the

notions and names of identity nnd diversity would be in vain,
end there could be no such distinctions of substances, or

anything else from one another. "5 In senses of identity (2),
(3)

and (4) Locke is attempting to find the basis for saying

•same* of an entity of the appropriate sort when it is in fact

the same entity.

He begins his analysis of the different applications
of the principle of identity with the problem of the identity of the atoms and arrregates of the atoms. He establishes

that the identity of the indivdual atoms consist In continuity of their existence. This continuity depends on the logical
4.

Ibid.

.

pp. 440-1

’>.

Tfrld.

.

P.

441.
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character

space and time, i.e., "wo never finding, nor

c-ncelvlng it possible, that two things of the sn-e kind
should exist at the sane place at the

tlme."^ Spatio-

sa-'e

temporal continuity would also make it impossible for the
same thing to exist at different places at the same time.

When we are concerned with the identity of atoms and ngrrerates of atoms, i.e., entities of inorganic nature, spatio-

temporal continuity is the means available for checkin?, the
identity of the entity in question. In the case of an individual atom

"

it is evident, that,

in any instant of its exist-

ence, it is in that instant the same with itself."?
"

In the case of aggregates of atoms

whilst they ex-

ist united together, the mass, consistinc of the same atoms

will be the same by the foregoing rule: and whilst they exist united torether, the mass, consisting of the same atoms,

must be the same mass, or the same body, let the parts be ever so differently jumbled."^

It is clear that what Locke is

concerned with here is not the shape of the mass, but simply the same "continuous and homogeneous” atoms remaining

attached together in the aggregate. For example, as long as
the same particles of a cube of sugar remain connected it is

6.

IbyL.,

p.

439.

"Locke's Doctrine
442, cf. Broad, C.D.
Theopja,
19;V/ol “
of Substantial Identity and Diversity,"
ume 1
p. I5ff.
7.

Ibid

3.

Ibid.

.

1

,

p.

,
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Identity here consists in, first, the spatio-

the sane cube.

temporal continuity of individual grains of sugar. Second,
the identity depends on the same grains remaining in the mass

regardless of their configuration. If these conditions are met
ve are justified in calling the sugar cube at time 2 the same
ns the one nt time 1.

In general, this is the case for in-

animate atoms.
In addition, Locke wants to establish another equally

inportnrt point, namely, "one thing cannot have two beginnings. ”9 if the first part of this principle did not hold

Locke's theory of spatio-temporal continuity would be undermined.

If an atom, for example, could have two beginnings,

there would be a lapse of time in which it did not exist.

Thus, its spatio-temporal continuity would be destroyed and

with that the possibility of calling it the 'same' atom.
From the following situation: (1) atom A continuous through
time lapse
(2)

1

and atom A' continuous through time lapse 2; and

atoms A and

A'

are similar in all respects except their

life histories appear in different time lapses; we have to

conclude on Locke's principle that there is not one

atom,

with two beginnings but rather two different atoms.
The second part of this principle is doubtful in the
orrealm of the Inorganic and totally inapplicable in the

ganic realm in that
9.

Ibid

.

,

p.

(

although Locke was unaware)
LUO.

a cell

can
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divide by mitosis into two identical
evils at the same instnnt. This is enough to call the second
part of hip principle into question at least ns it applies
to living
things.

However, there is evidence that Locke never intended
this

principle for the orranic realm. In regards the orrnnic
realm
it

is possible that A*

and A" could conceivably come into

existence at precisely that same instant from A by
similar to mitosis. It is

a

a

process

logical possibility. This, how-

ever, would neither destroy the spatio-temporal
continuity
o'*

the two atoms, nor the possibility of applying
the term

same

1

to them. But it would undermine the second part of

Locke’s principle that two things could have one berinning.
For example, if it could be shown by the continuity of ex-

istence of atom A

1

at time 2 (which is atomically equal to

or identical with atom A” at time 2) that atom A’

is the same

as the left side of the originally splitting atom at time

1

(atom A) then it would have been shown of what the identity
of atom A* consists. In other words, the spatio-temporal con-

tinuity of atom

A’

is not affected by the fact that two things

had one beginning.

Thus the only way to assert that an atom or an aggregate of atoms is the same at an earlier time is to be able
to trace them back to that earlier time.

If this is possible

then, and only then, can it be said that it is the same agrrerate.
if n

In the case of the latter it is the same

npgremte

comparison reveals that it contains now exactly the

33

atoms as it contained at the earlier
time. This identity is comprised of
the fact that apart from a change
sa-ne

in time

there is no other change. As Locke puts
it,
£ir,ts

MenUty,

"

in this eon-

when the ideas it is attributed to vary
not

at nil from what they were that moment
wherein we consider

their former existence, and to which we compare
the present." 0 And that which has been the same throughout
time has
had but one be finning and has been the same in virtue

of its

own continuous and homogeneous character.
The truth of spatio-temporal continuity was un-

questionable for Locke when it concerned the identity of
inorrnnic substances such as the atom or aggregates of
atoms.
But when we attempt to apply this criterion to living
orranisms such ns plants, animals and men certain difficulties

arise. We find that identity in these cases does not consist
in

the permanence of an aggregate of atoms. Some objects re-

main the same even though not in the same way that an aggregate of atoms remains the same. These remain the same insofar
as a certain basic structure of parts is unaltered and especial-

ly because they participate in one continued life

.

So, in the

case of plants and animals "the variation of great parcels of

matter niters rot the identity.

When we speak of the same

tree the identity which is meant in this case is separate

from the identity of the particles of matter which compose

10.

T

Md.

.

p. »39.

11.

IMd,

.

p>42.

l

tree. An oak tree i3 the eat,® throughout its development.

despite the fact that it Increases rreatly in size and

its branches -nay have be*n trimmed, etc., because it "has
such

an orranizntion of parts in one coherent body, pnrtnkinr, of
one common life, it continues to be the same plant as long

as it partakes of the same life," 1 2

This point is important. Since

a

living organism is

not merely an aggregate of particles its identity is independent of the particles that constitute it. There is a funda-

mental difference between
nr.d

a

mere aggregation of particles

an identity of an organization of parts, one coherent

body, partaking of one common life. The particles themselves
are not important. They have significance in that they re-

late to the living organism. As R. I. Aaron says in J ohn

Locke :
In its anxiety to reduce all things to simples

Locke's generation frequently missed this difference, but Locke asserts it explicitly, and his assertion is one more instance of his ability to pass beyond
the conceptions of his day and to free himself from
1
them. 3

So the identity of living beings cannot be explained
by appeals to the unity of substance because the identity of

such beings is not only inconsistent with but may encompass

substantial difference. This led Locke to the realization
that each kind of entity has an identity appropriate to its

p.443.

12.

Ibid,

13

Aaron, pp.

.

,

149-50.
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kind.
is-ns

A

special application of Identity of living ormn-

concerns the humnn orrnnism.
E.

The Identity of Man

As Locke dist inguished between

distinguishes between the identity of

-non

a

and person so he

manri

and the identity

of a person. He defines man as an animal body of

a

certain

shape. The human body is a livinr: organism. When we refer to
win* s identity we find that it differs in no special way from

any other livinr; creature. Thus, Locke was unable to find
"the identity of man in anything nlse, but, like that of other animals, in one fitly orrnnized body, taken in any one in-

stant, and f'rom thence continued, under one organization of

life, in several successively fleeting particles of matter

united to it." llf The identity o r man is just one special case
of the identitv of living orranisms. He says after speaking
of the identity of plants and animals, "This also shows wherein the identity of the same man consists; viz.

in nothing

but a participation in the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united
to the same orrnnized

body."^

In this sort of identity when ve speak of 'same man'
we mean that a particular human body has participated in one

14.

rssa y « Volume I,
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IHd

.

.

p.

444.
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continued life. A man Is the same nt time
2 ns nt time 1 if
thore hf,r>
no brenk in the continuity of his
life. This
renlly saying that the spatio-temporal
continuity
of

n

humn

body is necessary for the identity
of that tody, although
spatio-temporal continuity is not a sufficient condition
for

the identity of the human body ns it
is for atoms nnd aggre-

gates of atoms. As in the case of an oak a man could lose

indefinite yet inconsequential amounts of his bodily substance nnd still be the same man. A kidney transplant,
the

amputation of

a

leg, or even a heart transplant would not be

sufficient to destroy the identity of

a man,

i.e., the hu-

man body. As long as the same basic structure of its parts

participate continuously in one life the man would be the
same. Since Locke did not believe the person to be a hu-

man body or part of
al

a

human body he could not mean by person-

identity the identity of

a man.

And, "his account of per-

sonal identity, unlike his account of the identity of man,
is not a case, not even a very special case, of his account

of the identity of animals." 1 ^

The identity of man, then, is to be found in the

continuity of life of

a

bodily structure. In the case of an

amnesia victim whose personality was transformed beyond

identification due to memory loss we should still say he was
16. Shoemaker,

p.7ff.
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Urn

vord

sa-'e
I

ly.*’

man. He states, "we must here take notice what
the

is applied to; which,
Tiie

in

this case, is the man on-

use of the word *1* for self-ascriptions of

fineness and also the use of ‘he’ for other-ascriptions
of
saneness could only be applied to the body in this

cnse. Con-

vernly, usinf Locke’s example of the prince-cobbler case, if
"the soul of

a

prince carrying with it the consciousness of

the prince's past life, enter and Inform the body of

bler, as soon as deserted by his own soul," 1

^

a

cob-

no one, in

this case, would say the prince was the same man, since the

locution 'same man' would apply only to the body, not to the
person of an individual. Thus, the prince is certainly, for
Locke, the same person. Tor everyone, except the prince, the

man continues to be the cobbler, i.e., the bodily structure
of the cobbler. The words

*

I'

and 'he'

in ascriptions to the

prince could not refer to the body which was "entered and

informed," but only could refer to the consciousness of the
prince.

The term soul here is

a

replacment for what has pre-

viously been called 'immaterial substance.' Soul would do the
same work in this example as 'immaterial substance' hns done

elsewhere. That is to say, the soul would carry the prince's

consciousness alons with it just as the immaterial sub17. Essay
18.

Ibid.

.

.

Volume I,
p.

U57.

p.

^60.

.

stance would have consciousness annexed to It.
It Is nppnrent also that when Lock© uses the word
’spirit’ he has im-

material substance in mind. Locke distinguished
three different

types of substances, one of which was called
finite sub-

stance.

Locke never made this explicit but when we talk
of

the prince ns

soul, but

n

o.

person we are not talking of

conscious entity which is

a

n

nnexed

spirit or

n

to a spirit

or soul.

Bishop Butler arrues that this "shews demonstratively that there is no ground to think that the dissolution
of any other matter, or destruction of any other organs and

instruments, will be the dissolution or destruction of living

agents."^ Bishop Butler

is Justified in arguing this way

on Lockian terms, although this argument does not establish
the immortality of the person only the possibility of per-

sonal immortality. On the other hand, whether Locke is Justi-

fied In calling consciousness the identity of

human being

a

has not yet been established.

C.

The Identity of Mental Substance

Locke's inquiry forces him to consider

a

question

tefora he can deal with personal identity. That is whether

personal identity be the same ns the identity of the substance.
The

importance of this is whether the identity of

19.

Butler, Joseph,

1900, p. 9 ,22f f

a

person can

Analog y, Macmillan, London,

"
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be reduced to the

Identity of on lmat.rlal
substance. To
be sure, Locke believed,
"the core probable opinion
Is, that
this consciousness Is annexed
to, nnd the affection of,
one
Individual imamterinl substance. 2 °
In spite of Locke's contention that consciousness was annexed
to one or even nt different tines core than one
Immaterial substance, he did not
believe that the substance or the substances
constituted the
grounds for the Identity of
consciousness, i.e. , personal
identity.
Most philosophers prior to Locke
had regarded the

identity of the person ns nothing more
than the identity of
an

i

material substance,

Locke

,

although he rernrded human

heings not only as corporeal structure but as
immaterial

mental substance as well, was so dissatisfied with the
concept of substance as to seek another approach. One thing
is

clear now

-

just ns he distinguished between person nnd im-

material substance so will he distinguish between personal
identity and the identity of immaterial substance. Whatever

personal identity amounts to it does not consist in the i-

dentity of thinking substance. The identity of substance,
material or immaterial, "which, however reasonable or unreasonable, concerns not p-rsona^ identity at

a

11,"^

The

identity of thinking substance is lorically independent of
20.

Ksmy

21.

Gibson, p.

22.

Essay

.

,

Volume I, p.465.
11 3.

Volume I,

p.L*>0.

"

40
thft

iden ^ity of persona* thus the

fomcr

cannot. constitute

evidence for the latter, As Sydney Shoemaker says: "Personr\l

identity, vhile it may be correlated with identity of

substance, does not consist in this.

23

This conclusion is incorporated into Locke's answer
to two interrelated parts of a single question: (1) if think-

ing substance changes, can the person regain the same and (2)
if the

thinking substance remains the sane, can there be dif-

ferent persons?^* Eoth questions are answered in the affirmative. With respect to (1), the substance may be changed and

yet the person remains the same. That is to say, the identity of substance is neither necessary nor sufficient for the

identity of

a

person which requires only the existence of

the same continued consciousness. Let us say, where Pa is a

person annexed to a substance Sa at time

annexed to

a

1

and Pb is

a

person

substance Sb at time 2, according to Locke's

view ve could have Sa not identical with Sb and, yet, at the
same time, Pa identical with Pb. It may be the case that a

human being is not the same immaterial substance that ho was
three years ago, but if he has memories of what he did,

thought, felt, etc., three years ago, then he is the some
person. So, this means that we must admit the possibility

23.

Shoemaker, p.45.

24.

P-s

ra y* Volume I, pp. 4^3-6.
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of two thinking substances "may make one person. "^5
This is

true even though the most "probable opinion" is
that he is
the same Immaterial substance ns veil.

With respect to (2) of the question, on the other
hand, substance may remain the same and different persons at

different times mav be annexed to

it.

This again illustrates

that the identity of the person is independent of the identity of the substance. This time, substance Sa is identical with

Sb and person Pa is not identical with Pb, yet both Pn and

Pb are annexed at different times to substance Sa-Sb. Thus,
it is entirely possible that the same immaterial substance

may be

,

ns Locke puts it, "stripped of all the conscious-

ness of its past existence, and lose it beyond the power of
ever retrieving it again;" yet,

a

new "consciousness that

cannot reach beyond this new state" may have
thus resulting in

a

thinking substance.

a

beginning,

second person annexed to the oririnal
26
c

Since Locke admits to no knowledge of

the essential nature of immaterial substance, these cases ex-

ist, ve might say, as logical possibilities not ns knovnble

matters of empirical fact.
Locke maintains that part (1) of the question can
be

answered only by those who know whether the consciousness

of past actions can be transferred from one immaterial sub-

stance to another. He ndds that if the same consciousness
25. liliix. P- *^.
26. Ibid. . p.>*55.
1
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can

be transferred from one immaterial substance to
another

then there is no reason vhy two
or more immaterial sub-

stances rould not constitute

tmes.

"I'or the

a

single person nt different

sane consciousness being preserved, whether

the same or different substances, the personal
identity is preserved.” 27 Also, in relation
to part (2), if somein

one believes in pre-existence and maintains that he
is the

same person ns Nestor or Socrates, or any other individual

vho lived in the past, then he must also have their con-

Fclousness . The only way to be sure that the person who
makes this claim is the same Absent* person is to determine whether he has the consciousness of the actions and

ideas of that person as his very own actions and ideas. If
he does not, ho has no reason to claim to be that person.

For, "the same immaterial substance without the same con-

sciousness, no more making the same person, by being united
to any body, than the same particle of matter, without con-

sciousness, united to any body, makes the same person." 23
The conclusion of all this was ricen by I,ocke as

general principle several pages prior to the foregoing

discussion. There he says:
It is not, therefore, unity of substance that
comprehends all sorts of identity, or will determine it in every case; but to conceive nr.d judge
of it aright, we must consider what idea the word

27. Itidx, P- 1*?*.

23.

Ibid,

.

p.456.

a

,
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npolied to stands for; It. being one thin** to
another the same
and *
J*
a\Z^*
third
the same I^rgon, if jnihstance man and
r-r^n
are three
standing for three different ideasfor such is the idea belonr inr to that
name, such
must be the identity, 29
It

is

mrs

.

Thus the identity of each sort of entity is discon-

nected from the identity of other

.sorts of

things even though

those entities are themselves intimately related. The
identity of a thing is determined by the nature of the
entity to

vhich it is attributed. We cannot explain the identity of all
types

entities by the unity of substance. Each kind of

entity has its own appropriate sort of identity. We can see
from this how much Locke's view differs from the traditional

substantlalist exoinnation of the self. The difference be-

comes obvious when he turns his attention to the special

problems of personal identity. He cays "that self is not

determined by identity or diversity of substance, which it
cannot be sure of, but only by Identity of consciousness,"^
Locke never says how we are to determine the identity
of a mental substance. There is, however,

a

good reason for

his failure to do so. We have no direct perceptual evidence
for the existence of mental substances ns ve have seen. The

existence of mental substance, like the existence of substance in general, is an inference based on (a) the necessity for the qualities and processes of thought nnd perception

29.

Tbld

«

p.445.

30.

TMd,

.

p.465.
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to Inhere in something, end (b) the
experience that these
qualities nnd processes seen to cohere
together. His doctrine
of nentnl substance is offered, therefore,
to nccount for
this inherence nnd coherence. The processes
nnd qualities
of thought

or.d

perception which nre directly experienced can-

not exist on their own. Locke thought they must inhere
in

substance ns only

"somewhat

a

X

a

know not whnt." Now, since

It is not possible to observe the mental substance ns exist-

ing at any time nnd place, it is not possible to compare that

mental substance as existing, at

a

given time and place with

that mental substance at an earlier time and place. But such
a

procedure is necessary if we are to determine the entity

as the same one. In this case it is not possible to deter-

mine the identity of mental substance.
Since such

n

procedure is an impossibility, Locke

felt compelled to locate the identity of the person else-

where than in mental substance. His recognition that substance
cannot supply the basis for the identification of
a

a

person is

valuable contribution.
With the above in mind, ve come to his theory of

personal identity.
D.

Personal Identity

Locke reiterates often in Chapter 27 of Book

II

the

central tenet of his theory, that personal identity is not a

45

result of the identity of subst nnce but
rather the identity
of consciousness.
But this Is s one what vnrue.

Locke meant,

os ve have seen, or nt least he intended to
mean, by conscious

ness everyth inn that passes before the mind of
In this he has included (1)

£I*sent experiences and

a

human beinr.

the awareness of one's

the present awareness of one's

(2)

a o
El?-*-.

experiences.

’

The problem of personal identity is the

problem of determining: the evidence which would allow one to
sny, for for any riven x if x is

person, that x is the same

a

person at time 2 as it was nt time
person.

1

1.

The key phrase is 'same

Once it is understood on what rrounds it is appro-

priate to say so nnd so is the same person, then the per-

sonal identity problem has been solved. This, of course, de-

pends on what sort of an entity

a

person is. Since, for Locke

the person is consciousness of both past and present experi-

ences it is not strange to find Locke say in r, "For the same
consciousness be inn preserved, whether

in the same or differ-

ent substances, the personal identity is preserved. "33

Evidence for which it is acceptable for the attri-

bution of the 'same person' is brought out here:
For as far ns any intellirert beinr can repeat the
idea of any past action with the same consciousness

31

more

,

.

Ibid

t

,

pp.45H, 460 and 465.

32. O'Connor, D.J.
1952, p. 1 20.

33. Essay

.

,

John Locke

Volume I, p.454.

«

Ken ruin Books, Haiti
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n
first, and with the same conscioushas of nny present action; so far it Is Me
rn-e personal self. For it Is by the
consciousness It
rms of itz oresent thoughts nnd actions that
it is
self to itself now, nnd so will be the same
self, ns
fnr ns the same consciousness can extend to
notions
past or to come. 3*
'

ner.r

It

Consciousness of self, therefore, is not United
f-olely to present circumstances, but also
extends back into

the past.

Put bow

rn r

bnck? It includes nny nnd nil ideas

of past notions which were once conscious

to the self nnd

which cnn be brought into present consciousness. ’’Nothing
but consciousness cnn unite re-note existences into the same

person. "35 So identity of self depends on continued though

not necessarily unbroken consciousness. Whatever "existences
are united by consciousness into present experiences, no mat

ter how re-note they

-nny

be from one another, ve then have

the same person. This is the same ns saying that whatever

one remembers or whatever Is in one’s memory (or whatever

can be brourht into it) is the basis for the attribute of

sameness to that person. Where this consciousness is lacking the identity of self does not exist. This is because

Locke holds that consciousness is the single defining char-

acteristic of self, of person.
The experiences that occur in the consciousness of
a

given human being not only constitute the essence of

a

of a particular person, but also constitute the evidence on
34.

IMd.

,

p.451.

35.

TMrt.

.

P.U64.

which wo settle questions of Identity concerning tint person.

In Locke

snyin? that
1

a

’

s

view, then, the only evidence we have for

Riven person is the same at time

2

ns at time

is whether the person is aware at time 2 of the experience

which had occurred at time 1, and, is aware in such

a

way at

time 2 that the person is certain at time 2 that what occurred
at time

1

was In fact in his consciousness at time

1.

Thould

it happen that the experiences which occurred to a person
at time

1

could not be recalled by that person at time 2 then

it would neither be possible to say whether these "remote ex-

istences" were those of the same person or whether it was the
same person. Ihe contents of present consci ourness and the

rememberings of the past are the only grounds for determining
personal Identity.

While Locke maintains that the identity of self is

dependent on one's awareness of self, he does not regard the
self as limited in its extent to a realization of its con-

tents at the present moment. On the contrary, the self extends into the past ns far ns self-consciousness is capable
of reaching.

Also,* the identity of the self is entirely de-

pendent on the possibility of comparing
of past and present experiences.

sciousness is interrupted by

a

one’s consciousness

It does not matter if con-

lapse of time between one con-

scious period and another. Locke says that one person by
l*pse of consciousness would no more be two persons "than

a
a

48

rmn be two men by wearing other cloth es today
then he did

yesterday ,

"

because it Is the case that "the same conscious-

ness uniting those distant actions Into the same
person,

whatever substances contributed to their production. "36

Denying this possibility of comparing past with
present experiences would be an absurdity which would underline the possibility of ever determining the identity of any

entity of any sort.

In any application of these relations to

entities whether atoms or persons, ’’identity and diversity
are relations and ways of comparing well-founded, and of use
to the understanding." 37 Then, in general, for Locke, deter-

mining identity involves the mind’s capability of comparing
an entity at one

time with that entity at an earlier time.

This depends on whether the mind can remember or bring into
present consciousness that entity (the idea of the entity) as
it was at the

earlier time. If this method is allowed for any

entity it has to be allowed for the entity Locke calls person.

If it is denied, we cannot determine sameness for any-

thing. We may make mistakes when we are comparing things, but
to deny that ve compare things is to risk becoming hopelessly

confused.

According to Locke, consciousness as

a

basis for self

and personal identity is not mere Reeling. It is an intellec-

36.

Ibid

,

.

pp.451-2.

37.

TMd.

,

p.U4l.

49
tu-tl

function founded on the kind's capability of
-nuking

comparisons. Comparing ideas with respect to time
nnd place
is one of the fundamental operations of the
mind

according- to

Locke.

It is not strong© then that the self is able to
in-

quire into its own identity by seeing certain past actions
or

experiences of its own. It

is on the

basis of this that per-

sonal identity rests, even though its foundation comprises
noth in r more than its own capacity to compare

present idea by virtue of

a

a

pact with n

continued consciousness.

Personal identity is possible only when the more complex intellectual functions exist. An animal does not have

reason and reflection so it is most likely incapable of com-

paring its past with its present. Thus the only identity
Locke would attribute to an animal is the identity of an or£nn ism:

...blasts compare not their idea further than some
sensible circumstances annexed to the objects themselves. The other power of comparing, which may be
observed in men, belonrinr to reneral ideas, and useful only to abstract reasoninrs, we may probably conjecture beasts have not.™

Locke considers several practical examples which were

desirmed to clarify his analysis of the personal identity
problem. Attention to these examples is necessary because:
(a)

thev bring into focus Locke's insight into certain puz-

3*.

Ibid.

.

p.204.

39.

ibid.

.

p,r>05.

^
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zle eases that are relevant to personal

identity ,(b) they

help to clarify the relation or lack of it between personal
identity and bodily identity and (c) they ret the stare for
the final sections of Chapter 27 vhere Locke considers per-

sonal identity ns it relates to the moral aspect of deter-

mining praise or blame. It Is the aiornl implications of the
idea of personal identity which caused him to consider the

problem in the first place.
An example that illustrates (a), (b) and (c)

is the

prince-cobbler case:
For should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the
consciousness of the prince’s past life, enter and inform the bodv of a cobbler, as soon as deserted by his
own soul, everyone s*es he would be the same person with
the prince, accountable only for the prince's actions:
but who would say it was the same man? The body roes to
msklnr the man, and would, I fpiess, to everybody determine that man in this case, wherein the soul, with all
its princely thoughts about it, would not make another
man: but he would be the same cobbler to everyone besides himself.

Here we see much of what is pood in Locke's analysis
as well as what perhaps has led him astray. The prince a-

wakens one morninr. to find his body transformed into that of
6

cobbler's. Yet, his mental life, memory, etc., are the

same as before. In Locke's view he can say to himself, "I £3
the sa-e person who went to sleep here last r.ir.ht."

V.'hat

he

means is that he has an nbldinr. consciousness of yesterday’s

perceptions and actions as his own. The identity or this per.

son

is r.ot the

identity of any body or orr.anism. The self-

UO. Ibid.

.

p.

’*57.

51

ascription Is correct

-

yet, the body (-mm) of the prince
Is

di^erent. Co, personal identity
the body.

is

logically lndenerder^

Even if his consciousness censed to
exist for

njr

a

min-

ute vhile he slept but resumed when
he awakened in the body
° r tnP c °bbler,
would be the some person as he could

recnll to consciousness the actions and
experiences of yesterday ns his own.
Hov.

ip self-ascription possible? Only by consciousness

which is inseparable to thinking and essential to
sciousness alone determines sameness of

a

it.

Con-

person.

The prince may have difficulty convincing others that
he

is not the cobbler but he

the

should be accountable only for

prince's actions. If the cobbler Ins committed some crime

before the transference of the prince's soul into his body,
the prince would be bard pressed to convince the Jury that he
(the

prince) was not the same person who should be punished.

Locke believed that bodily identity was not sufficient for

establishing personal accountability. We could even sav that
Locke may have held that bodily Identity was not even necessary for the establishment o r personal identity. Indeed, from
the

prince-cobbler case, bodily identity can even be detri-

mental to determining personal identity. If the prince could
only convince the Jurors on the basis of his conscious life

Alone he would be found innocent of the cobbler's crime. Put,
•

such an option is not available to him.
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"i

erson

,

Locke states, "!s

"

n

forensic tern, appro-

priating actions and their merit," Locke interpreted ’person’
in terns of moral

accountability. For him, a person is not an

accountable person, and so not

a

person at all in bis restrict-

ed sense, unless it is possible to ascribe his past
actions to

bis present consciousness. Consciousness "constitutes" the ac-

countable person. No person can be justly punished for those

actions which cannot be appropriated to his present consciousness ns his own. Locke states, "whatever has the consciousness
of present and past actions, is the same person to whom they

both belong.

He has emphasized what most will admit

-

that

logic of moral responsibility presupposes an ability to cor-

rectly affirm 'same person’ of the individual in question. If
a

person's thoughts and actions nre his

ovti

.

if he is to be

held morally responsible, he must not only originate his
thoughts and actions but must be the same person now ns the

originator of those thoughts.
Locke had an interest in guaranteeing moral responsibility. Tf he could settle the question of personal identity
in its practical application to moral responsibility he could

establish

a

system of rewards and punishments. He realized al-

so that human

Justice could not rely wholly on the evidence of

rm identical self as the evidence for establishing accounta-

bility. The prince cannot establish his innocence on the bns41. Ibid.

,

p.4*tf.

-
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is of his conscious life alone because he cannot
make the

jurors directly nwnre of it. In

concluded that

a

a

less drastic case, Locke

man is punished for actions committed in a

fit of drunkenness even though he has no consciousness
of

them vhen he is sober. "For, though punishment is annexed
to

personality, and personality or consciousness, and the drunk
nrd perhaps be not conscious of what he did, yet human judica-

tures justly punish him; because the

fact,

is proved nrainst

him, but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him."* f 2
It is the person who is morally responsible.

Although

it is sufficient to establish by physical evidence before a

jury that the man is the one who committed the crime it is

not sufficient to show that he is the person who should be
punished. What makes

a

person responsible for

a

crime is be-

ing aware of what one is doing and remembering it. Thus, con-

sciousness is both present awareness and memory and is both
the necessrv and sufficient condition for personal identity.

Locke's conclusion is, therefore, "whatever past actions it
cannot reconcile or appropriate to that present self by con-

sciousness,
been done."

it can be

no more concerned than if it had never

43

The bifurcation that Locke develops between man and

person, bodily and personal Identity has made it impossible

•

42. Ibid.

.

p.463.

Tbld,

,

p.46?.

*3.

for hi-n to speak of the hunnn being ns a unity with a double

criteria for identification. Instead, he has been employing
two entities each vlth its

ov.-n

criteria for identification

regardless of how closely united they amy be. This result
sterns

fro*a

his belief that there is but one criteria cf 1-

dentity for each entity. It

-any

have been this belief that

led hlai to fraraent his conception of hu*aan being into separate entities. His desire to punish only that v:hich could be

accountable, i.e., the conscious part ofahunan being. This

bifurcation is ill-fated for it is the basis for the
criticise of Locke's concept of
of personal identity.

a

aiain

person and his analysis

CHAPTER
concludum

IV

co?rn:::TS ai:d

crtticichs

0 4l « of the central features of Locke's theory
is his

bifurcation of the human individual into two entities,
and person.

mn

This bifurcation is not only primary in his analy-

sis of personal identity, but it is also the source of the

inadequacies of that analysis,
Locke separated person and man for good reason. As
has been discussed, the separation stems from two main sources. First, he believed that only the conscious part of a hu-

man being could be the spent of responsibility. Second, Locke

believed that each entity had its own criterion of identity
and that for each entity there wa3 but one criterion. These

are the presuppositions according to which Locke proceeds. In
the first place, his basic position is that person is

a

fo-

rensic term appropriating actions and their merit. So he was

willing to apply the term person only to an entity which he
took to be consciousness. Since man is that part of the hu-

man individual which is composed of material particles, it
could not be the vehicle of consciousness, and, therefore, it

could not be the

a rent,

of responsibility. Yet, in saying that

the same consciousness is the same as the same person Locke

was certainly not reflecting an ordinary use of either term.
In the second place, Locke vns evidently unwilling

55
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to adult the possibility that there could bo
entities which

hnve more than one condition of identity.
So, in ascribing

responsibility to

n

human beinr, it might be necessary tc be

nble to say that he is the same
find

-nan

who committed the crime

that he is the same person (i.e., the same conscious-

ness), and therefore
,

,

he ought to be punished.

In Locke's

view it is necessary nnd sufficient to establish only the
same consciousness of the individual in question. In hig

prince-cobbler case, for example, Locke would certainly be
concerned ns to the prince's consciousness, which becomes
•attached* to the body of the cobbler, being punished un-

justly for deeds committed by the cobbler. In such

a

case,

the courts would be Just in punishing the 'person' under sus-

picion not if there was no proof of diversity but only if
there was positive proof of identity. In order to convict the

person of some crime the prosecution ourht to be nble to
prove, in Locke's view, that the accused has the same con-

sciousness as the 'person' who committed the crime. If this
cannot be done, then the accused ourht not to be held responsible.

Although this may have been the situation Locke was
striving for, it does not do Justice to the numerous situations in which it is not possible to establish 'same consciousness' and still the individual could not be absolved of re-

sponsibility. Cases of amnesia do not automatically discount

questions of responsibility. The sanity or insanity of an
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Individual accused of

a

crime nay constitute reason for

holding the individual responsible althourh treatment and not
punishment is appropriate. The individual who rets fire to

a

warehouse any not he conscious of ha vine done so but the
courts, no doubt, would hold him responsible deciding in

favor of remedial treatment. The paramnesia victim who con-

venes to and

is able to reconstruct In detail a riven crime

and did not commit the crime would not be responsible on

Locke’s principle, although if the authorities did

in

fact

function on Locke's principle they ought to hold the individual responsible. The individual ought to be held responsible

even in the face of counter evidence for the person and man
are separable entities for Locke. The problem is, therefore,

that the authorities have no right to accept counter evidence
in face of ’direct testimony'

of the consciousness of the in-

dividual on Locke’s principle. Or, they must find a way to

demonstrate that the consciousness of the individual in
question is not the same ns the criminal's. However, there
is no wav to do this apart from bodily evidence in the face

of direct testimony.

These cases show that the problem of establishing the
same consciousness of an individual in assigning punishment

His
and reward is more complicated than Locke imagined.
inanalysis exposed for the first time the difficulties

volved in providing adequate conditions for saying 'same
that which is responsible in

a

human being. Hut since his

of

s
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thesis views the human be hip, ns

a

combination of two

separable entities rather than a slnple complex entity with
two criteria of identification he is unable to handle cases
such as those mentioned in the precedinp pnr.arrnph. In his
view, it is always contingently possible for the conscious-

ness of an individual to become detached from his body so
one can never appeal to bodily criteria ns rrounds for

establishing identity. On the basis of some other view which
treats the human beinp ns

a

complex entity whose conscious-

ness can become distorted and even suppressed but not de-

tached. one can always identify the individual on the basis
of bodily criteria. Therefore, one can hold the individual

responsible once the identification is made without the

necessity of

administerinr punishment.

basis
It mirht have been thourht that it is on the

of this defect that Locke's analysis is unable to withstand
But this is not

the penetrntinp criticism of Antony Flew.

necessarily true. It mirht be possible on

a

strict inter-

could espretation of Locke's position to show how Locke
even if Slew's criticape Flaw's perceptive analysis. But
with Locke’s position
cism were successful, dissatisfaction
view has bifurcated
remnins on other prounds because Locke's

entities.
the human beinp into two separate
of the problem
Flaw's criticism of Locke's solution

"Locke and the Problem of iersonfr*. tics.l
Collection
al Identity," Lacks. 2T-A F*rk*lev: A
and
i>oub!eday
and dTvT Armstrong
a r
l n
ed. C . 3
F.f r a v
,
173 .
Co., Garden City, 196*, pp. 155
1.

Flew, Antony
'

.

1
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of personal Identity focuses on the fact that ’’Locke's criterion is nt the sane tine both too strict in blackballing nnd
too lenient in ndnittlng candidates

roughly:
et tine

**or

Locke's criterion is

any person, that person is the sane at tine 2 as

if he

t

.

is conscious nt tine 2 of vhat was done, thourht

or said by rone person Y at tine

1

as having been done, thourht

or said by X. Kiev/ naintains that since consciousness is e-

quivalent to nenory in Locke’s nain statenents of his position,
it is

le pi tinate nove

a

in the

interests of both clarity nnd

brevity to substitute ’renenber' for 'be conscious of' in re-

fomulnt ions

of Locke's thesis. ^ Flew holds slnply that what

Locke neans by

"sane consciousness ns person A"

A's nenories of A's experiences. Yet, we

must, be

is having

careful in

equating consciousness with nenory since the forner includes
vhat is passing before the nind as well ns what has passed before the nind. But this observation does not soften the force
of Flew

'

s

criticisn for it is precisely that part of conscious-

ness which depends on renenbering past experiences which is
applicable to personal identity. It is this fact, that nenory
is

mbsuned under consciousness, which allows us

to substi-

r
of
tute 'renenber' for 'be conscious of' in re ornula tions

whole of conLocke's thesis. Menory is not equivalent to the

sciousness but only to that part which is applicable to per-

2.

Ibid.

,

P.

1*0.

3.

Ibid.

.

p.

159.

'
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scnnl Identity.

Following Flew nnd substituting 'remember' for 'be
conscious of,' Locke's criterion for persons! identity would
now be:

<*or

nt tine

1

any person X, that person is the sane at tine

if he can

2 ns

ren^nber at tine 2 vhnt was done, thought

or raid by sone person Y at tine

1

nr,

having been done,

thought or said by X. Flew contends that due to ambiruity
of
the

terns 'can' nnd 'remember' there are four alternative

fornulntions of this criterion. Flew subjects each of these
to careful analysis nnd finds none of then satisfactory.

Thus he concludes that Locke has failed in his attempt
to solve the personal identity problem. The following is an

outline of the possible alternatives resulting from the am-

biguity of these terms nnd then an examination of Flev's criticisms to see whether he in fact is right.

There are, according to Flew, two ways of interpreting 'can' and two woys of interpreting 'remember' thus re-

sulting in the following list:
(A)

'can': (1)
(2)

'as n matter of fact,'

'factual.'

'without self-contradiction,' i.e., 'logical.

(B)

i.e.,

'remember': (1)

'

as entailing the truth of what is
remembered,' i.e., 'genuine remembering.
'

'

(2)

'as an honest memorv claim but there
is no entn ilment of what is remembers Implv nnd bor.est memory
ed,' i.e.,
4
claim.
'

Wit):

>.

these various interpretations mnde explicit

IMd.

.

p.1^0.
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they can now be combined into four alternative

r ormulnt

ions

° r Locke s criterion by putting into that
criterion the vari’

ous meanings of 'can' and

remember

*

Each of the formula tions

'

.

is subject to one or more objections, according to Flew.

shall summarize Flew

1

a

I

formulations since the content of them

has been riven in the list above. Then,

I

shall briefly state

his objections to each formulation before contlnuinr with the

analysis of Locke's position. Combining alternately the Varied

ous meaninrs of 'can' and

1

remember

*

we ret:'

(I)...(A)2 and (B)i. Flew objects to this formulation as
a

necessary but futile truth.
(IT),..(A)1 and (B)1. Tf this is taken to be the menninp,

of Locke's criterion, then it is exposed to two serious ob-

jections. First, it excludes too much, for sometimes we want
to say ve have done something, but cannot remember having done
it.

His point is that even though we cannot as

a

matter of

fact remember having done the thing, we are, nevertheless,
the same persons as did them. This formulation is too exclu-

sive for we would not be able to say of the amnesia victim,
for example, that he is the same person. Thus, supposedly,

Locke would be wrong in claiming that

a

person is responsi-

ble only for those things he is conscious of, i.e.,

bers.' Second

,

'remem-

this formulation is subject to Held's Gallant

aged
Officer counter example. This counter example is that an

5.

Ibid.

.

pp. l6l-’63.
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general , who was flopped ns a boy for stealing from nn orchard
nrv

^ oror(> d ns a young of r icor for capturing

‘

is

nr.

enemy stnndnrd,

unable to remember the flogging, yet, he remembers being

honored; nn d, when he was honored ns

n

young officer he re-

membered the flogging. Flew contends that

H

on Locke’s princi-

ple we should have to say thnt the renernl both is nnd is not
the

same person ns the orchard robber."^ Thus, we have

n

con-

tradiction.

(III)...(A)2 nnd (B)2. This formulation if too inclusive.
Thus, whenever

a

person can without self-contradiction make

nn honest memory claim, Locke would be oblired to say thnt he
is the

'same person.' That is to say, whenever

ly claimed having done

did

it.

a

person honest-

something, he would be the person who

This would allow cases of paramesia.

(IV)...(A)1 and (B)2. Flew believes thnt this formula'

tion is open to all three criticisms brought arainst (IT) nnd
(III). He says it is too exclusive, ignoring amnesia cases nnd

internally inconsistent, as it is exposed to the Gallant Officer example.

Such is Flew

*

ly nn impressive one.

s

case against Locke nnd it is certainHe continues his analysis by consider-

ing how it is thnt Locke has got himself into this ’’confused

and catastrophic position." It might be possible, however, to
eashow that one of Flaw's formulations of Locke's criterion

6.

Ibid.
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cnp^e FIhv's criticisms; yet, we would remain dissatisfied with

Locke’s analysis of person and personal identity on other
grounds surre3ted above.
It

possible that the fomulation represented by

is

(II) escapes criticism if we pay strict attention to vhnt

Locke means by person. This possibility will shed further

light on Locke's view.
Can a strict rending of Locke's position enable him
to escape those criticisms Flew brings against (IT)? fuch a

formulation implies that whether

a

person can remember some-

thing he did, said or thought at an earlier time is simply a
matter of fact. That is to say, whether

a

riven individual

recalls what he experienced at an earlier time is
gent matter. The second feature of such

once

a

a

contin-

a

formulation is that

person is able to say, "I remember p ns having been

done, said or thourht by me,” then it is necessarily the case
that

•

p'

va_a

done, said or thourbt by the person in ques-

tion. The situation which such a formulation covers is that
r.ny

genuine net of rememberinr always entails the truth of

vhnt is remembered even though it is always
that

a

a

continent fact

given person can or on any given occasion genuinely

remember what
son can ns

a

lie

experienced at an earlier time. When

a

per-

matter of fact genuinely remember what he said,

did or thought at an earlier time, then he is the

'same per-

son' now who experienced those things at that time.

This requires amplifying Locke’s terminology. When
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Locke says thnt personal identity rests on the possibility of
an individual "beinr conscious of” the notions he performed

nt nn earlier time,

I

believe he hnd something like Flaw's

formulation (II) in mind. So, whenever

n

person is conscious

of vhot occurred to him nt the earlier time, then it is neces-

sary that what he is conscious of did occur to him.

I

think

this is the appropriate formulation of Locke's criterion.
It should become apparent how formulation (II) care-

fully interpreted on Locke's concept of

Flow's criticisms. The
it excludes too much.

dividual could ns

a

''irst

a

person avoids

criticism against (II) claimed

It excludes those cases when an in-

matter of continent fact remember but

for whatever reason is unable to remember his past experiences.

However, Locke would nrree that such cases do occur and

thnt his criterion would exclude them. For example, it would

eliminate the amnesia victim who was "stripped of all his

consciousness of his past existence,” and, therefore, Locke

would not want to say that he is the same person. The amnesia
victim would be unable, as

a

matter of fact, to renuinely re-

member his past continuous life and thus would not be the
same person on Lockinn terms. This would not be viewed ns

a

defect bv Locke since the criterion does what is expected of
it.

the
One may nr rue that this shows that Locke's use of

pretended
word 'person' is not the ordinary use, but he never

thnt it was.
but much
This formulation would also exclude similar
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loss dramatic cns^s than the amnesia victim, e.g.,
cases of

ordinary forgetting. It vould also not allow the pnrnmnesln
case for the parnmnesinc could not, ns

n

Titter of fact, make

a genuine memory claim. Locke's answer, no doubt, would be

that given such

a

case ns ordinary for retting we would be o-

blired to admit that the person (i.e, the consciousness of the
individual) is not the same person ns at the earlier time. We

may still want to maintain with Flew that this formulation
does exclude too much, but appeals to ordinary usar.e nre not

sufficient to touch Locke. This formulation excludes precisely those cases which Locke wants to exclude. For Locke,
ve do not have truly the same person
er time unless he

before us as at an earli-

genuinely remembers what was experienced at

the earlier time. His rcneral claim most probably would have

been that he was attempting to include in the cate gory of
'same person' all and only those persons who could be held

accountable; since amnesia victims nnd parnmnesincs nre not

accountable, they

c annot be

called 'same persons.' It might

also be added that formulation (TI) would allow that the
prince of the prince-cobbler case was the same since he could

genuinely remember his experiences prior to his change of
bodies.
The second crticism which fomulntion (II) is supparadox.
posedly subject to is that of the Gallant Officer

internal to
The paradox purportedly unmasks inconsistencies

Locke's criterion. The result of this paradox, if it is
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successful

is to

,

serve as

Locke's criterion to

whether It
nl

a

a

counter example which exposes

self-contradiction. We must inaulre

the case that "on Locke’s principle ... the rener-

is

loth is and is not the same person ns the orchard
robber."

Theoretically, this paradoxical situation

is

supposed to fol-

low from the fact that on Locke's principle the conscious-

ness of the reneral is

.at

once the same as the younn officer's,

but not the 3ame a3 the orchard robber's; yet, the younp, of-

ficer's consciousness is the same as the orchard robber's.

Since person, according to Locke, is only consciousness, the body of the orchard robber, the younr. officer and
the

p.eneral

even though it presumably participates in one

,

continued life, is irrelevant ns to whether the person is the
same or not. The paradox must prevail independently of the fact

that the body of the general participates in one continued
life.

With this qualification havinr been noted, what Locke

would be required to Flaw's Gallant Officer case, if he is to
remove the

e

r

<*ect

of this criticism, is that the conscious-

ness of the younr officer is the same ns the orchard robber's
only in some respects (he remembered the flogging) and the

general's consciousness is the same as the younr officer's

only in some respects (he remembered being honored) but not
in

other respects, l.e., ho did not remember the flogging.

There are relevant respects in which the consciousness of the
general is the same as the younr officer’s and other rele-
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vant respects in which it Is not the sane

,

but this Is neither

paradoxical nor inconsistent. The contradiction cones fron
blur r in r the distinction.
xhe Gallant Officer paradox is itself not beyond
re-

proach.

It secns to function on the principle thnt if rela-

tion X holds between A and B and also between B and C,
then
it

mist hold between A and C.

do function this way
it

is

apparent the

'

-

It is true thnt nnny relations

those which are transitive. However,

renenber

'

(or be conscious of)

is not a

transitive relation. That is to say, fron the fact thnt Pb

remanbers Pa, and Pc rcnenbers Pa, it does not follow necessarily that Pc renenbers Pa, even if the individuals Pa, Pb
and Pc are Lockian

'persons' annexed to the sane continued

body. It is the nature of mencry to function non- transitively

for Locke and for anyone else

no doubt.* Therefore

,

the only

way the Gallant Officer example is to succeed is if confusion
is

allowed in about the relevant respects in which the gener-

al's consciousness is the sane as the younc officer's with
those respects in which it is not the sane.
If these observations have succeeded in freeing (II)

fron difficulties, then we have Locke's criterion in its best

possible Torn. The other three fornulations are in any event
indefensible. (I) is
link

a

futile truth.

(Ill) would allow anyone

in r, an honest nenory clain to be the

sane person.

(TV) would

nake
be even broader for it would allow that anyone who could

would
an honest neeory clain even with possible contradiction
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be the

same person. The last two would present hopeless situa-

tions for honest memory claims

are never sufficient to

establish that an act of remembering has taken place.
The purpose of Locke's criterion of identity was to

enable him to establish who or what it is that is responsible
for some given act. His criterion formulated as (II) includes

cases that he wanted to include and eliminates doubtful ones.
If a person can, as a matter of fact, remember some earlier

experience, then he is the same person who had the earlier
experience. Thus part B(1) of formulation (II) excludes the

honest memory claim which is, in fact, incorrect, and part
A (1) excludes the person who fails to remember.

Even if this interpretation of Locke's criterion
has allowed him to escape Flew's critisms, we would still

remain dissatisfied with his overall view for, in cases of
dispute, no means are available to enable external observers (legal authorities, etc.) to decide except that direct

testimony of the individual in question. We remain dissatisfied with Locke's view because the general cannot be held

responsible for the acts of his youth. On another rendering of the concept of person, one which views the person as
a

complex entity composed of consciousness and body, the

general could be held responsible for, but presumably would
not be punished for, the acts of his youth.
its
The problem is not with Locke's criterion in

analogous to the one
best form formulated as (II), but it is
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noted above concerning the statement "I am a person" as an
assertion. Here the problem may be formulated as concerning

when it is that the statement "I remember p" is a report of
genuine remembering. This problem expressed in another way

concerns the grounds on which it is possible to decide in

a

given case between genuine remembering and simply an honest

memory claim. Locke has to maintain that for his criterion to

work there must be some cases in which the statement "I remember p" is a report of genuine remembering. But in order to
ascribe praise or blame for past actions it must be possible
for those attempting to make the ascription to pick out the

cases when such an utterance is genuine from when it is only
an honest claim.

It would be contrary to ordinary facts to

maintain that every such utterance is

report of genuine re-

a

membering, thus the necessity for determining which ones are
and which ones are not.

Locke cannot appeal to bodily evidence either in support of or in opposition to the utterance of the locution
for, as we have seen above, it is always contingently possible for an individual to utter a sentence "I remember p" when

such is not the case, i.c., the paramnesia victim. Those who

were attempting to ascribe blame for

1

p

1

according to Locke's

principle would be obliged to hold the individual responsible even though he had not committed the crime. A person's

direct testimony is evidently all that can count as evidence
in Locke's view.

If Locke is willing to admit bodily evidence
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on the grounds that only when it can be shown
that the person has become separated from the body
in question are we re-

stricted to the exclusive use of direct testimony,
then two
tnings seem to follow'. Not only would the only evidence
a-

vailaule to show that the person has become separated from
the

oody in question be the person's direct testimony and,

tnus,

tne burden of proof would fall on the prince to prove

that his person was not that of the cobbler, but also, by
such a move, Locke has given up his thesis that there can

only be one criterion for each entity.
This suggests that Locke's criterion of personal

identity is not sufficient for the assignment of responsioility except for the person who does the remembering. Anyone elso attempting to ascribe responsibility to another for

former actions cannot rely on that person's memory testi-

mony as sufficient grounds for identification. Thus, in

Lockian terms, skeptical doubts are possible in any given
case as to whether the person before us is or is not the. same

person. If the criterion works for the individual in question
but not for others, then there must be

Locke's technical concept of

a

a

good bit wrong with

person which was introduced

primarily to facilitate assignment of responsibility; but
which, as it turns out, has made it impossible for anyone except the person involved.

Locke shows vague awareness of the inadequacies of
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his position when he says in
connection with punishing the
..ober man for his actions
when drunk, "want, of consciousness
cannot be proved for him." The
point is that he admits that
the laws punish the man
unjustly because consciousness cannot
proved for him, but Locke offers
no way out and, indeed, on
his principle there is no way out.
On Locke’s principle, the
establishment of the identity of the man is little help since
it is entirely possible
that the person now attached to
this body before us was not
in fact the same person
attached to this body at an earlier
time. To say that only a person
conscious of having said or
done something ought to be held
responsible is one thing.
ut Loc/ce has failed to realize
that it is not necessary to
Tiake

person and man separable entities in order to do this.

It is only necessary to realize that
consciousness is an ele-

ment of a human being which on occasion becomes suppressed
and distorted. When it does, we may hold the individual
re-

sponsible and yet not punish him for his actions. The only

way that Locke can help us out of these difficulties is by

insisting that each utterance of ”1 remember p M is, beyond
doubt, a guarantee of its own truth and sufficient grounds
for the ascription of identity to the person making the

assertion. Thomas Reid has appropriately observed:
Thus it appears that the evidence we have of our
own identity, as far back as we remember, is totally of a different kind from the evidence we have of

t
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the identity of other persons or of objects
of
sense. The first is grounded on memory and
gives
unaoabt.ed certainty. The last is grounded on
similarity and on other circumstances which in many
cases are not so decisive as to leave room for

doubt .

In conclusion, Locke clearly distinguishes the i-

dentity of man from the identity of person. He says
that
the identity of man consists in the
same continued life of

constantly fleeting particles united in succession in
the
same body. As long as the same human body remains
alive
it is the same man. This is not what is meant
by personal

identity. There is a sense in which his insistence on this

reminds us that certainty about the same man is not suffi-

cient grounds for certainty about the same person (consciousness). Locke would say that certainty about the same

man is not necessary grounds for certainty about the same
person. But it is only on the basis of human form and verbal reports that we are able to ascribe
all.

'same person'

at

It is because 'same man' and 'same person' are inti-

mately associated throughout time that we can identify in-

dividuals and make sense out of talking about puzzle cases
like the prince-cobbler case. If the prince-cobbler or am-

nesiac or paramnesiac cases were the norm rather than being

conceptual possibilities or as unique cases requiring special
handling, there would be little success in ascriptions of
'same person'.

Reid, Thomas, Essays on the Intellectual Po wer s of
P« 205.
Man, cd. A.D. Woozley, Macmillan, London, 19V1
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